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Angela Breitenbach  
 
Over the last decade or so philosophers have become increasingly dissatisfied with 
the dominant focus on the notion of knowledge in contemporary epistemology. 
Understanding, it has been suggested, is an important intellectual goal, often valuable 
over and above knowing the facts. But there is much disagreement over how exactly 
this suggestion is to be spelt out. Does understanding consist in a specific form of 
knowledge?
1
 Or is it a cognitive state intrinsically distinct from, and irreducible to, 
knowledge?
2
 And if the latter, how does understanding differ from knowledge? 
 In this paper, I sketch an answer to these questions which I attribute to Kant. By 
contrast with contemporary accounts, Kant’s primary epistemological concern lies not 
with knowledge but with cognition and its intuitive and conceptual conditions. What 
contemporary epistemologists call ‘understanding’ is, for Kant, a type of cognition. 
Knowledge, by contrast, does not present a form of cognition and, hence, differs in 
important respects from understanding. This conclusion, however, does not imply a 
multiplicity of potentially conflicting cognitive goals. The important insight of Kant’s 





1. Understanding as faculty and achievement 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the understanding (der Verstand) as 
one of “the higher cognitive faculties” (KrV, A130/B169), the faculty to judge or 
think. As a spontaneous rather than receptive capacity it is importantly distinct from 
sensibility. While sensibility receives indeterminate input directly, the understanding 
determines sensory input by means of concepts. Despite this difference, however, 
Kant famously argues that “it is just as necessary” for cognition 
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to make the mind’s concepts sensible [sinnlich machen,] (i.e., to add an object to 
them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable [verständlich 
machen] (i.e., to bring them under concepts) (my italics, KrV, A51/B75). 
  
 The understanding, thus construed as a faculty of the human mind, has little in 
common with the notion of understanding discussed in contemporary epistemology. 
As the cited passage indicates, however, Kant construes understanding not only as the 
faculty of cognition (henceforth ‘the understanding’), but also as the result of 
employing this faculty (henceforth simply ‘understanding’).This second notion of 
understanding as intellectual achievement recurs in the Jäsche Logic as the fifth item 
on Kant’s list of seven “grades of cognition” (Log, IX 64): 
 
to understand something (intelligere), i.e., to cognize something through the 
understanding by means of concepts, or to conceive (Log, IX 65). 
 
Understanding is a type of cognition by means of concepts, where cognition, the 
previous item on Kant’s list, is characterized as “being acquainted with something 
with consciousness” (Log, IX 65). The type of cognition which constitutes 
understanding requires both intuitions given in sensibility and conscious 
representation by means of concepts “that pertain to objects” (KrV A78-9/B104-5). If 
I understand that this ring is gold, for example, I conceive of the object in front of me 
under the concept ‘gold’ and thus pick it out and determine it by such marks as 




2. Understanding, insight and comprehension 
Kant distinguishes understanding from more complex forms of representation that 
unify individual cognitions. In the Jäsche Logic, he differentiates understanding from 
the two highest forms of cognition, insight and comprehension: 
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The sixth [grade of cognition]: to cognize something through reason, or to have 
insight [einsehen] into it (perspicere). With few things do we get this far, and our 
cognitions become fewer and fewer in number the more that we seek to perfect 
them as to content. 
 The seventh, finally: to comprehend [begreifen] something (comprehendere), 
i.e. to cognize something through reason or a priori to the degree that is 
sufficient for our purpose. For all our comprehension is only relative, i.e. 





 The main difference is that insight and comprehension, but not understanding, 
present cognition through reason, the “faculty of inferring” (KrV, A330/B386), 
characterised by the search for the conditions of the objects of cognition.
6
 Insight and 
comprehension require not only that I recognise a given object under a concept, but 
also that I can infer its existence and specific features from general “principles” (KrV, 
A299/B356). For example, in order to have insight into, and comprehend, what gold 
is, I need to understand not only what the properties of gold are but also “why it does 
not rust, why it is ductile, [and] heavier than others” (V-Lo/Blomberg, XXIV 135).
7
 
Moving from understanding to insight and comprehension thus requires systematic 
cognition of an object under universal principles from which the properties of the 
object can be inferred a priori.  
 As we know from the Transcendental Dialectic, however, fully systematic 
cognition of the complete conditions of objects can never actually be achieved. All 
insight and comprehension are necessarily limited, falling short of ultimate 
explanations. The move from insight to comprehension can thus consist only in the 
move from incomplete insight to cognition that is sufficiently complete for a 
particular purpose. For example, if I were interested in comprehending why gold does 
not rust, it is sufficient for my purpose to learn that rust occurs as the result of a 
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corrosion process, that this process involves the transfer of electrons from iron to 
oxygen in the presence of water, that gold is resistant to the same type of oxidation, 
and that it is resistant because its electronic configuration is too stable to give up 
electrons in normal environmental circumstances. Insight into these conditions of 
gold’s resistance to corrosion would be sufficient relative to my interests, even though 
further questions could be asked, for instance, about the conditions of the electronic 
configuration of gold. Only insight that is relatively sufficient in this way constitutes 
‘comprehension’.
8
 As the highest, most ambitious, form of cognition attainable for us, 
Kant argues that it provides the basis for “science” (KrV, A832/B860). 
 
3. Advancing understanding 
Seeing how different things we understand are systematically related and can be 
inferred from one another presents an accomplishment over and above the simple 
achievement of understanding. However, Kant also sometimes construes 
understanding in a third and stronger sense, for example, when he contends that “one 
always understands best what one can make oneself” (V-Lo/Dohna, XXIV 731).
9
  
 Kant does not suggest that making something oneself is a necessary condition 
for understanding. He argues rather that making something helps us gain 
understanding. In his Pedagogy Lectures he is more explicit: “The biggest aid to 
understanding something is to produce it” (Päd, IX 477). Moreover, the reason why 
producing something is an aid to understanding is not simply that we practice concept 
application. It is, more specifically, that we learn to apply and infer from general 
principles and thereby come to grasp the laws and conditions that determine the 
thing’s existence and specific nature. For example, in the Pedagogy Lectures, Kant is 
concerned with the use of the student’s own reason in applying grammatical rules.  
 To make sense of Kant’s link between understanding and making for oneself, I 
thus suggest we read Kant’s claim as relying on a notion of advanced understanding, 
involving an intellectual achievement that results from the kind of unification Kant 
associates with insight and comprehension. The understanding resulting from such 
unification, moreover, is importantly continuous with basic forms of understanding. It 
consists in the more and more detailed conceptual representation, the deeper and 
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deeper understanding, of the objects given in sensibility. As Kant’s use of “best” 
indicates, understanding comes in degrees, ranging from basic to more complex forms 
of cognition, systematically integrated under general principles to a higher and higher 
degree (V-Lo/Dohna, XXIV 731). 
 The suggested reading finds support in the way in which Kant introduces his list 
of the degrees of cognition in the Jäsche Logic. Kant there presents understanding, 
insight and comprehension as grades on a scale of cognition, progressing “in regard to 
[…] objective content” (Log, IX 64). The more insight we gain into the connection 
between individual cognitions, the more we grasp about the general marks contained 
in our concepts and the specific marks falling under those concepts. And the deeper 
our grasp of the content and extension of our concepts, the more complete our 
understanding of the nature of the objects cognised by means of those concepts. Kant 
thus employs a gradual conception of understanding as consisting in the conceptual 
representation of an object given to the senses, a type of cognition that can be 
advanced, though never completed, by systematically unifying individual cognitions.  
 
4. Understanding and knowledge 
How, then, does understanding relate to knowledge? Kant’s answer is far from 
straightforward. He takes up the topic of knowledge in the ‘Canon of Pure Reason’ 
and in the Lectures on Logic, but he remains silent on the relationship of knowledge 
to understanding.
10
 Despite such limited explicit engagement with the questions of 
this paper, however, recent commentators are agreed on two important insights they 
find in Kant.
11
 First, on Kant’s account, knowledge is a type of representation that is 
importantly distinct from cognition. Kant characterises knowledge as a holding-to-be-
true of a judgment, where this holding-to-be-true is both subjectively and objectively 
sufficient. Only knowledge, not cognition, thus requires assent to a judgment and 
justification of its truth.
12
 For example, I may understand my ring to be gold, and 
judge that it is made from a yellow, ductile metal that does not rust. And yet I may 
have no grounds for assenting to the truth of the cognition and withhold judgment 
when asked whether the gold-coloured material is genuine. I may withhold judgment, 
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for instance, because upon consideration I deem my unaided identification of gold 
unreliable, and because I might discover that I am wearing a convincing fake. 
 Second, on Kant’s account, the relationship between cognition and knowledge 
consists in the contributions cognition makes to the possibility of knowledge. 
Cognition can provide the judgments to which we assent in knowledge claims, and it 
can offer grounds for assenting to the propositions we take ourselves to know. My 
unaided detection of gold may not be especially reliable, for example, but my unaided 
identification of earrings certainly is. My observation that there is a pair of earrings in 
my jewellery box can thus serve as grounds for assenting to the claim that I own a 
pair, even if, by itself, such cognition is no adequate proof that the earrings I own are 
made of gold.  
 The concept of cognition on which commentators have focused is that of basic 
understanding. Recent discussions can therefore shed light on the relation between 
basic understanding and knowledge. Broadening the focus from basic to advanced 
understanding, however, raises additional questions. For even if individual cognitions 
can ground individual knowledge claims, it is unclear why systematically unified 
cognition should be a mark of science, something that for Kant – as for us – has an 
intrinsic connection with knowledge.
13
 But if science requires knowledge, why should 
we identify advanced understanding with “the scientific in cognition” (KrV, 
A832/B860)? In other words, why should the goal of advancing understanding get us 
any closer to that of knowledge and truth? 
 Kant highlights the difference between advanced understanding and knowledge 
in the logic lectures. Like his list of the degrees of cognition that vary with respect to 
objective content, he presents opinion, belief and knowledge as ways of perfecting 
cognition. However, the two types of perfection occur along distinct dimensions. 
While the scale that culminates in understanding, insight and comprehension specifies 
how we can achieve deeper and deeper understanding, with more and more distinct 
objective content, the progress from opinion to belief and knowledge specifies 
differences in the degree of certainty with which we assent to the truth of cognition. 
The two types of perfection aimed at advanced understanding and knowledge are thus 
conceptually distinct; we may perfect cognition in one dimension without perfecting it 
in the other.  
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 Does this imply that the two types of perfection present two separate cognitive 
goals? Kant’s answer, I suggest, is that although understanding does not require truth, 
the aim of advancing the former has an indispensable function in the search of the 
latter. In particular, advanced understanding is required for knowledge of the specific 
laws of nature and of their (possible) implications.
14
 As Kant argues in the Appendix 
to the Transcendental Dialectic, the search for higher-order principles from which 
lower-order marks can be inferred “always presupposes an idea, namely that of the 
form of the whole of cognition” (KrV, A 645/B673). Although we can know a priori 
that all natural phenomena are governed by universal laws, only systematically 
unified cognition, or advanced understanding, can provide the objective grounds for 
assenting to the truth of judgments about empirical necessities.
15
  
 Kant thus concludes that “the systematic unity of the understanding’s cognitions 
[…] is the touchstone of truth for its rules” (KrV, A647/B675).
16
 By analogy with a 
tool for assaying the purity of precious metals, Kant suggests that the systematic 
unification of individual cognitions, and hence the advancement of understanding, 
functions as a test – albeit a negative one – for the truth of empirical laws. Advancing 
understanding thus provides the means for seeking the objectively sufficient grounds 
for holding a judgment to be true or, simply, for knowledge. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The account suggested here of Kant’s conception of understanding and its relation to 
knowledge remains at best a programmatic outline. It will require elaboration and 
justification. But if it can be shown, as Kant maintains, that unification is a test in the 
search for empirical truth, then advancing understanding will be our best guide in 
science. Although understanding and knowledge are distinct types of representation, 
they are thus indirectly related. The coherent unification of cognitions is not only a 
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means of advancing understanding, but also a test of the truth of what we understand. 
Rather than presenting isolated goals, advancing Kantian understanding provides an 
indispensable means in the search for knowledge.  
 It is sometimes suggested that understanding is more demanding than 
knowledge. If we understand how rainbows come about we do not only know that 
they are the effect of sunlight, refracted and reflected through droplets of rain. We 
also have a deeper sense of how such knowledge fits in, more broadly, with the 
physics of optics and the physiology of colour vision. According to this suggestion, 
understanding a phenomenon is an intellectual achievement in addition to knowledge. 
According to Kant’s conception, however, the initial plausibility of this suggestion is 
only partially defensible. On his account, knowledge of meteorological phenomena 
must ultimately be grounded in experience, and hence in sufficiently advanced 
understanding. On this conception, the example does not suggest that we can have 
knowledge without understanding. It shows rather that understanding may come in 
degrees, and that we can have a basic understanding of rainbows without possessing 
the advanced understanding of a trained physicist. 
 It is also sometimes argued that understanding is less demanding than 
knowledge. In the history of science, progression from one theory to another at times 
increased understanding even if neither theory was strictly speaking true. Newton’s 
laws improved understanding of the motion of planets over and above that made 
possible by Kepler’s laws, yet neither account got it all right. On the Kantian 
conception, we can account for such claims. We can argue that Newton’s theory 
advanced understanding beyond Kepler’s, insofar as Newton’s account increased 
unification among cognitions. The fact that neither theory was strictly speaking true 
presents no obstacle to this claim. Furthermore, on Kant’s account, the importance of 
this historical case concerns the insight that the goal of advancing understanding 
guides the search for knowledge. Even if, strictly speaking, neither Kepler’s nor 
Newton’s theory was able to ground knowledge, the continued attempt at advancing 
understanding provided the only available method of seeking a true account of 
planetary motion. 
 
